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PHILIPPINE TRADE POLICY OPTIONS 
Florian Alburo, Erlinda Medalla and Filologo Pante Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores trade options for the Philippines in the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. We do not 
purport to be exhaustive in identifying a wide range of 
alternatives nor do we claim to have the best ideas about the 
stance the country should take in the Negotiations. 
The specific objectives of this paper are: (a) to review the 
trade experience of the Philippines; (b) to indicate some policy 
options in the context of the Uruguay Round; (c) to describe the 
products or markets which have apparent i m p o r t a n c e t o the 
Philippines in the present Round/ the priorities the country can 
take, and the new issues that will be covered in the Round; and 
(d) to suggest some strategies which can be pursued by the 
Philippines in the Round. 
In order to provide the perspective within which the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Uruguay Round must 
be viewed, the next sector briefly reviews the trade experience 
of the Philippines, focusing mainly on the evolution of the trade 
structure and trade performance over time. Section 3 
subsequently discusses GATT and the Philippine's role in it, 
particularly in the last round of multilateral negotiations. 
Section 4 zeroes in on the Uruguay Round, why it is important for 
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the Philippines, what the Philippines' priorities in the Round 
should b e , what political coalitions the Philippines is 
participating in and what new issues are included in the Round 
and how Philippine interests are affected by these. The 
following section outlines an agenda for the negotiations under 
the Uruguay Round, highlighting options and strategies. Section 
6 concludes the paper. 
II. TRADE STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
The trade and exchange controls of the fifties created an 
economic environment favorable to full-scale import substitution 
as consumer-goods industries profited from relatively free 
imports of capital goods and the high domestic price of finished 
products engendered by the system. The foreign exchange needs of 
the import substituting industries were satisfied mainly through 
the exports of commercial agricultural crops and not through the 
concomitant break-out into industrial exports. As a result, 
Philippine exports have been characterized by products with low 
value-added, weak inter-industry linkages, excessive concentra-
tion on a few items and continuing reliance on agriculture or 
agriculture-related products in terms of net foreign exchange 
earnings, the respectable surge of nontraditional manufactured 
exports in the late 70s notwithstanding. 
There is very little perceptible change in the Philippine 
trade structure between 1950 and 1970. The top ten principal 
exports the country relied on for foreign exchange did not change 
during this period. They accounted for 75.0 to 85.0 percent of 
all exports. in the case of imports, there was a decline in the 
share of consumer goods (which was 90.0 percent in the 50s) and 
an increase in the share of capital and intermediate goods 
leading to what can be characterized as import-dependent import 
substitution. 
Since the early 70s, there have been significant shifts in 
the structure and pattern of trade. This can be partly explained 
by the series of external shocks that hit almost all open 
economies as well as the conscious policy shift towards exports 
of manufactures and incentives to promote their trade. The share 
of the ten principal exports fell dramatically to about 34.0 
percent in 1980. Similarly, the share of traditional products 
fell from 18.5 percent in 1970 to 14.0 percent in 1980; sugar 
from 20.0 percent in 1970 to 3.5 percent in 1985; and forest 
products from 20.0 percent in 1970 to 4.2 percent in 1985. 
Conversely, the share of nontraditional manufactured exports 
(e.g., electronic components, garments, handicrafts, chemicals, 
furniture and parts, footwear, etc.) to total imports increased 
from 8.3 percent in 1970 to 61.7 percent in 1985. Another 
important aspect of this structural change is the increasing 
significance of services trade (freight and insurance, travel, 
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investment income, etc.). In 1973, receipts were US$639 million 
while in 1978 they rose to US$1.09 billion. 
This change in trade structure is not only confined to 
products but markets as well. The principal destinations of 
Philippine exports, while remaining basically- the same, have 
actually declined in importance. In the early 70s, both the US 
and Japan constituted 74.0 percent of Philippine export markets. 
By 1985, this had dropped to 44.0 percent with the slack taken 
up by ASEAN, the socialist countries and Hongkong, Australia and 
the Middle East. For imports, the shares of both the US and 
Japan declined from 57.0 percent to 39.0 percent during the same 
period. 
Despite what seems to be evident as structural changes in 
trade pattern and performance especially in the 70s, Philippine 
trade still suffers from some fundamental weaknesses. 
First, while the base of export products has been widening 
and the concomitant processing has been growing, there is concern 
over a disproportionate share of just a few products in the 
spectrum ....of nontraditional manufactures. In 1985, 59.0 percent 
of these new exports were accounted for by electronics" and 
garments which have higher import content than, say, processed 
food, handicrafts, furniture or footwear. 
Second, the trade pattern and performance evident in the 
recent past has not corrected inherent balance of payments 
problems that seemed to occur chronically. m i s is not of course 
directly traceable to the structure of "imports or exports per se 
but to larger factors (e.g., exchange rate) that condition them. 
But what is problematic is the shift in the export basket towards 
those requiring more imports. 
Third, the structure of the country's industrialization path 
continues to retain vestiges of the distortionary protection 
system of the 50s and 60s and the narrow base of industry it 
spawned. This is reflected in the structure of tariffs, system 
of regulation, incentives package, and government participation 
in industry despite the reforms in the trade area starting in 
1980. A more even protection and neutral incentive system will 
have , to be considered in the further restructuring of trade and 
industrial policies. 
Recent Performance 
Trade transactions (especially merchandise imports) fell in 
1984 and 1985. By 1986, the trade deficit had narrowed down to 
US$202 million compared to the US$2.4 billion in 1983 (see 
Figure 1). The cost of this adjustment was a substantial 
economic contraction in 1984 and 198S. pff^t-ivplv spttina bank 
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Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of exports and imports 
between 1976 and 1987. Much of the structural characteristics 
identified and discussed earlier can be clearly discerned from 
these Tables. 
The shifting pattern of^ exports towards more nontraditional 
manufactures hides a certain weakness when assessed from the 
viewpoint of net foreign exchange earnings. Whereas traditional 
agriculture-related exports require small amounts of imported 
inputs, this cannot be said of Philippine nontraditional 
manufactured exports. The latter are often produced on 
consignment (for exports) or with imported inputs and 
intermediates in processing zones or bonded warehouses. For 
instance, of the US$919 million of electrical component and 
equipment exports in 1986, US$640 million was imported as 
materials for their manufacture or some 70.0 percent. The value 
of these imported inputs is about 30.0 percent of export value, a 
fraction.which has not changed since 1980. 
The structure of protection in the Philippines is shown in 
Tables 3, 4 and 5. The first two tables show that nominal tariff 
rates vary by sector and end-use. On a sectoral basis, it can be 
noted that the largest concentration of nominal tariffs in 
agriculture is in the 20-25 percent range (40 percent) followed 
by those in the 40-50 percent range (32.1 percent). In the 
manufacturing sector, the largest concentration is in the 40-50 
percent range (31.7 percent), followed by those in the 10-15 
percent range (25.1 percent). By end-use, the highest average 
nominal tariff is on consumer goods (38.1 percent), while the 
lowest is on capital gross (22.3 percent). Table 5 presents the 
Effective Protection Rates (EPR) between 1979 and 1985. It 
reveals that EPRs continue to exceed the maximum nominal tariffs 
for certain sectors because of the cascading nature of tariffs. 
III. GATT AND THE PHILIPPINES 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is the only 
multilateral contractual instrument that lays down agreed rules 
for international trade. Its roles include administering the 
rules established by the General Agreement and investigating and 
resolving disputes between trading natrons when necessary. In 
addition, it provides a forum where nations can negotiate and 
work together for the reduction of tariffs and other trade 
barriers. 
There are two fundamental principles embodied in the 
Agreement. First, the nondiscriminatory "most favored nation" 
(MFN) clause which stipulates that trade must be conducted on the 
basis of nondiscrimination. This is a commitment that a country 
will extend to another country the lowest tariff rates it applies 
to any third country. Thus, when a country agrees to cut tariffs 
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Table 2 
IMPORTS BY COMMODITY 6R0UPS 
SITC 
Class 
Coaaodity 6roup 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Jan-Oct. 
e Food 6 Food Prepara-
tions - 299 299 296 354 492 563 650 528 425 426 399 369 
02 Dairy products 55 70 60 96 112 135 167 128 66 72 98 122 
03 Fish & Fish prepara- i 
.. tions 30 22 24 20 26 30 36 7 1 9 9 13 
0-1 Wheat 113 78 85 106 149 151 156 135 131 104 129 80 
0-2 Rice 12 .. - 5- — - - - - 42 110 - • -
Other 89 124 127 132 205 247 287 254 185 137 163 154 
1 Beverages S Tobacco 35 44 44 4B 1 1 53 66 75 35 76 72 83 
2 Crude Materials, Inedible 133 189 219 260 269 256 267 233 201 206 221 267 
263 Cotton 37 30 44 36 44 .34 20 29 28 25 33 38 
Synthetic fibers 43 55 56 75 62 79 78 66 47 50 57 63 
Iron, ore under con-
signment - 30 45 49 74 60 74 49 62 56 42 39 
Others 53 74 74 100 89 83 95 89 72 75 139 127 
3 Mineral Fuels & 
Lubricants 890 991 1030 1385 2248 2458 2105 2123 1649 1455 I£9 1024 
Coal and coke 2 9 15 14 22 19 26 16 41 50 42 . 19 
321 Petroleua, crude 801 859 907 1115 1857 2061 1764 1741 1472 1277 99 147 
4 ftnisal i Vegetable 
Oils & Fats 7 11 11 11 11 11 22 33 13 13 11 
5 Chemicals 352 £32 525 670 741 765 B1 771 All 584 111 747 
51 Cheaical compounds 132 160 203 249 267 298 254 267 230 219 -272 269 
54 Phartaceuticals 39 43 56 61 69 72 82 76 54 52 71 86 
Ores 10 29 37 51 89 57 59 45 43 62 54 51 
Fertilizer, excluding 
ores 11 14 11 40 50 48 49 46 45 44 29 26 
Others 160 136 214 261 266 290 224 337 233 207 285 315 
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(Table 2 cont'd) 
S1TC Cosaodity Group 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1991 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Class Jan-Oct. 
6 Manufactured Goods 
Classified Chiefly 
by Material 468 
64 Paper & paper products 29 
65 Textile yarn and 
fabrics 58 
601 Iron & Steel 196 
69 Metal products 81 
Others 106 
7 Machinery 4 Transoort 
Equipoent 1666 
71 Non-electrical 
eachinery 625 
72 Electrical aachinery 187 
73 Transport equipaent 276 
8 Hiscellaneous Manu-
factures 11 
Professional scien-
tific & controlling 
instruaents 37 
Others 44 
9 Cooaodities and Tran-
sactions Not Classified 
Elsewhere 287 
Materials for aanu-
facturing electric 4 
electronic 91 
Material for eabroidery 
or aanufacture of 
garaents 115 
Others 81 
Total looorts 3674 
549 703 945 962 682 1031 
36 53 62 . 67 64 67 
40 44 117 144 158 150 
237 304 43B 399 325 423 
71 107 128 133 148 . 172 
125 151 " 200 244 182 219 
1022 1129 1788 186S 1797 1668 
549 717 935 1015 945 983 
138 203 229 342 392 385 
293 389 544 460 460 295 
12 124 141 200 200 115 
55 71 77 126 128 118 
42 57 64 74 72 77 
279 446 863 954 326 
107 219 351 549 626 677 
95 121 125 142 148 150 
77 104 136 172 140 99 
3915 4712 6142 7727 7946 7447 
931 579 504 654 748 
65 66 65 73 84 
183 • 154 140 207 220 
356 186 135 204 259 
142 55 75 58 48 
100 114 93 112 137 
1592 1086 727 806 893 
902 420 366 395 412 
404 427 293 333 370 
206 233 68 78 111 
178 102 106 Ail 119 
106 74 61 58 59 
72 64 45 55 60 
1633 1343 1012 1136 1185 
765 803 584 640 624 
140 226 194 253 256 
128 314 232 243 225 
7487 6070 5151 5044 5366 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, National Census and Statistics Office. 
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Table 3 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF NOMINAL TARIFF RATES 
BY SECTOR, 1988 
(In %) 
Nominal Tariff Rate Agriculture Mining Manufacturing 
5.0 - 10.0. — - - — 
10.0 - 15.0 25.7 72.2 25.1 
15.0 - 20.0 — — — 
20.0 - 25.0 40.0 24.1 21.7 
25.0 - 30.0 — — — 
30.0 - 35.0 .9 3.7 21.4 
35.0 - 40.0 — .1 
40.0 - 45.0 3.7 — 8.2 
45.0 - 50.0 29.4 — 23.5 
100.0* 10070* 100.0* 
*May not sum to 100 due to rounding error. 
Source: Tariff Commission. 
Table 4 
UNWEIGHTED AVERAGE NOMINAL TARIFF 
BY PRODUCTION AND END-USE SECTOR, 1988 
(in %) 
Sector Average 
Food Beverage Tobacco 35.9 
Textiles 40.1 
Wood and Products 36.4 
Paper and Printing 30.8 
Chemicals Petroleum Coal 22.0 
Nonmetallic Mineral 33.4 
Basic Metal Industry 15.6 
Machinery and Metal 25.0 
Other Manufacturing 36.3 
Consumer Goods 38.1 
Intermediate Goods 25.2 
Capital Goods 22.3 
Source: Tariff Commission 
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Table 5 
EPR BY D - 0 SECTOR 1979 & 1985 
Sector Description 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 5 
EPR (%) EPR (%) 
- 2 - 2 
-7 -7 
-4 -4 
87 48 
- 1 - 1 
- 1 - 1 
3 Corn 
4* Coconut Incl. Copra 
in Farms 
6* Banana 
7 Other Crops Including 
Agricultural Services 
Exportable 
Importable 117 65 
12 Commercial Fishing -3 -2 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable -4 -4 
13 Fisnponds & Other Fishery 
Activities 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable -2 -2 
14* Forestry & Logging -20 -20 
15* Copper Ore 0 0 
16* Gold & Silver Ore 0 0 
17* Chromium 0 0 
18* Nickel 0 0 
19* Other Metallic Ores 0 0 
22* Rice & Corn -1 
23* Sugar -6 -6 
24* Milk & Otner Dairy 
Products 191 106 
25* Coconut Oil 2 2 
26 Cooking Oil ** ** 
27 Meat & Meat Products 124 65 
28 Flour & Other Grain 
Mill Products 58 58 
29 Animal Feeds 495 240 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable ** ** 
30 Other Processed Food 176 76 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable ** ** 
32 Tobacco Manufactures 299 110 
33 Textiles & Goods 
Excl. Wearing Apparel 106 42 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable 232 100 
34* Wearing Apparel and 
Footwear 0 0 
35* Lumber 55 55 
12 
Table 5 (cont'd) 
Sector Description 1 9 
EPR 
7 9 
(%) 
1 9 8 5 
(EPR (%) 
36* Other wood 12 12 
37* Furnitures & Fixtures 3 3 
38 Paper & Paper Products 108 101 
40* Leather & Leather Products 0 0 
41 Rubber & Plastic Products 125 65 
42 Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 35 35 
43 Industrial Chemicals " 15 11 
Exportables .0 0 
Importables 22 18 
44 Fertilizer 23 25 
45 Other Chemical Products 227 118 
46 Gasoline 27 23 
47 Diesel Oil 14 10 
48 Fuel Oil 10 7 
49 Avturbo/Kerosene 38 31 
50 LPG and Others 1 -16 
51* Cement 0 0 
52 Other Nonmetallic Mineral 
Products 54 31 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable 66 38 
53 Basic Metals 47: 26 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable 72 42 
54 Fabricated Metal Products 176 126 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable 201 144 
55 Machinery except Electrical 38 22 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable 40 24 
56 Electrical Machinery and 
Appliances 116 88 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable 116 88 
57 Transport Equipment 118 56 
58 Miscellaneous Manufactures 20 8 
Exportable 0 0 
Importable 50 27 
Note: *pure exportable sector 
**negative free trade value added 
Source: Tariff Commission-PIDS Staff Paper Series No. 86-05\ 
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on a particular product imported from one country, the tariff 
reduction automatically applies to imports of this product from 
any other country eligible for most favored nation treatment. 
Second, any protection given to.domestic producers should be 
enforced essentially through tariffs, so the extent of protection 
is visible. Certain exceptions are provided for and are 
contained in the articles on Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (Art. VI), General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions (Art. XI), Subsidies (Art. X V I ) , and General 
Exceptions (Art. XX). 
After the termination of the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 
1974, the Philippines and the US have conducted their trade 
negotiations within the GATT's framework. The Philippines 
participated in the Tokyo. Round of negotiations as a .provisional 
member. After its provisional membership from August :: 1973 to 
December 1979, it finally acceded to GATT in January; 1980. 
..The Philippines, as a new entrant to the GATT during the 
Tokyo Round, potentially had much to gain in terms of tariff and 
trade , concessions. From the application of the "unconditional 
MFN" principle alone, the country was assured of a host, of 
indirect .concessions from all the other member countries. : Being 
a developing member country, it could also- use the GATT as a 
venue : for channeling requests for Generalized System , of 
Preferences (GSP) rates of duties which developed member 
countries (donors) unilaterally grant for selected commodities. 
Aside from these indirect concessions, it could also actively 
negotiate bilaterally for tariff and trade concessions which it 
does not have to fully reciprocate following the S & .D (Special 
and Differential) treatment for developing countries. Finally, 
aside from these tariff and trade concessions, the country could 
choose to be a signatory to specific "codes" or side agreements 
which it deems beneficial. 
In this regard, the Philippines chose to pursue MFN rates 
for major export products and GSP for lesser exports. Though 
requiring reciprocal concession, MFN concessions are viewed to be 
more permanent. On the other hand, GSP concessions, being 
unilaterally granted, are "free." However, they are subject to 
various limits, review and change, and are applicable only for a 
limited period of time. Hence, it was felt that if the country 
had to "pay" for concessions on certain commodities, these 
commodities should be substantially important exports, and the 
benefits more long-term. The Philippines submitted its lists to 
eleven (11) participating developed countries, accounting for 
around 92.0 percent of its exports and 72.0 percent of its 
imports in 1976. However, it was able to, finalize bilateral 
negotiations only with seven, namely: the US, EEC, Canada, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The other countries did; 
not make any request from the Philippines. Thus, there was no 
matching of requests in the latter countries and no negotiations 
were carried out. Still, some concessions were granted by these 
countries unilaterally. 
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If comparing concessions received against concessions 
granted were the sole gauge in evaluating the results of the 
negotiations, then the Philippines came out clearly ahead. It 
received much more tariff concessions than it granted. In terms 
of value traded in 1980, US$997 M ($340 M from direct concessions 
and $497 M from indirect concessions) worth of imports from the 
Philippines received concessions representing approximately 20.0 
percent of the country's total exports. On the other hand, it 
granted concessions affecting only US$496 M worth of Philippine 
imports ($23 M receiving an average 40.0 percent depth oE^cut and 
$474 M binding at same or higher rate) representing around 6.0 
percent of total Philippine imports. 
While the T o k y o Round represented a step forward, including 
the fact that the concessions were proposed, argued, negotiated 
and processed in a multilateral f r a m e w o r k m a n y important issues 
were either glossed over or failed to be developed, particularly 
those in agriculture, safeguards, subsidies and dispute 
settlement. In order to pursue t h e s e critical issues and to avert 
a decline in the world trading system as protectionism 
resurfaced, trade frictions increased and frustration over GATT 
spread to many nations, the call for a new Round of negotiations 
mounted. The GATT contracting parties met in 1985 to discuss the 
possibility of such a new Round. A Preparatory Committee 
established ' in late 1985 began formulating the basis and 
mechanics for the new Round. 
Despite the difficulties in formulating an Agenda acceptable 
to all parties, the Ministerial meeting in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay in July 1986 re-affirmed, albeit shakingly, the belief 
that GATT must be strengthened and that; all contracting parties 
should continue to adhere to its principles. After all, this is 
the only framework for keeping world trade functioning smoothly. 
IV. THE URUGUAY ROUND 
This section aims to spell out a rationale for the 
Philippines' participation in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (MTN), suggests some priorities which the 
Philippines can take, and describes the emerging coalitions which 
the country is actively participating in. An elaboration of the 
new issues in the forthcoming Round caps the discussion. 
Many developing countries including the Philippines did not 
fully participate in the last GATT Round. The country's 
participation had a narrow focus on limited offers and requests. 
The idea was to ride on tariff reductions which were negotiated 
among industrial countries and which were to be available anyway 
by virtue of MFN. On the other hand, much greater emphasis was 
placed on special and differential treatment for developing 
countries or nonreciprocity for tariff concessions they obtain. 
Conditions since the Tokyo Round have rapidly changed. 
Trade has grown significantly especially among the developing 
countries. Moreover, there has been an increasing amount of 
trade outside GATT either biased against small, emerging 
exporters or under different rules. This includes trade in 
textiles and related products under the Multi-Fiber Agreement 
(MFA) which seems to have become a permanent arrangement, trade 
in steel, and other manufactures under voluntary export 
restraints, not to mention many nontariff barriers which were in 
place. Apart from these, the industrial countries continued 
their subsidies to agricultural products and their trade, . again 
outside the GATT frameworks This has diminished the potentials of. 
developing countries' agricultural products' competitiveness . for 
exports. 
In the Uruguay Round, the major concern is how the 
fundamentals of GATT can be preserved; in order to prevent the 
degeneration of the framework- for world trade. The Philippines 
should see GATT as the institution capable of putting greater 
order to world trade for as long as trading nations and its 
contracting parties agree on the need for a framework governing 
world trade. GATT seems to be still the primary vehicle for 
discipline in global trade and forum for negotiation, agreement 
and settlement of disputes among trading countries, both 
developing and developed. 
There is a perception that GATT is a "rich men's club." This 
is partly because of the degree^ of trade dominance by the 
developed countries and of the passive participation by the less 
developed ones. But world trader has expanded with increasing 
participation from developing nations. -It is only appropriate 
that the latter should actively: participate and demand for a 
greater voice in the formulation and implementation of the 
international trading framework. 
The alternative to GATT seems to be even worse especially 
for the Philippines. Bilateral arrangements "among rich men" 
effectively excludes all others from directly and indirectly 
benefiting, and reduces trade potentials and opportunities. The 
task is for the Philippines to support efforts to bring GATT back 
into the centerpiece of trade discipline. 
Priorities for the Philippines 
What should be the priorities of the Philippines in the 
Uruguay Round? What combination of procedure and substance will 
the country find most appropriate for its desired growth' path? 
There are a number of items that can have a substantial impact on 
trade structures and flows. 
First, tighter rules need to be adopted as regards measures 
limiting import restrictions without violating the notion of 
balance of payments or threat to serious injury and their 
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temporary n a t u r e . It is essential for the Philippines to 
articulate the nondiscriminatory exercise of Article XIX and its 
transparency in implementation. It is equally essential to call 
for greater commitment to c o m p l e m e n t such safeguards with the 
political will to carry out a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s . 
Priority attention on this is aimed at: (a) reducing the 
frequency of invoking injury,or balance of payments consideration 
for the restriction of imports or c o n v e r s e l y , tightening the 
Code; and (b) ascertaining the neutrality of policy actions or 
c o n v e r s e l y , sticking to GATT p r i n c i p l e s . While it is true that 
the Philippines can benefit from the.use of I'GATT-inconsistent" 
devices (such as., orderly ; marketing a r r a n g e m e n t s , voluntary 
r e s t r a i n t s ) , especially against. t d y n a m i c , e x p o r t e r s , one : m u s t 
distinguish between short-term and long-term trade structures 
that reflect real comparative a d v a n t a g e s . 
S e c o n d , the Philippines should put a premium on. the 
reduction or elimination of. nontariff measures and seek rollback 
c o m m i t m e n t s . . As more trade is restricted via nontariff b a r r i e r s , 
the more difficult it becomes to p r e d i c t flows nor quantify their 
adverse effects on the global system of e x c h a n g e . J 
These two priorities should be applied to two areas o f 
global' trade of interest to the Philippines, namely: trade in 
agricultural products and trade in textiles and a p p a r e l . The 
former is to be carried out by improving market access through 
removal of nontariff b a r r i e r s , increasing discipline in the use 
or removal of subsidies in agriculture ev^ecially in the US and 
the E E C . The intent is to liberalize trade in agriculture and. 
minimize barriers and other distortions related to structural 
surpluses. The latter is to be carried out by advocating 
alternative means that would integrate these products into the 
conventional GATT rules (while their trade is — administered by 
G A T T , they do not fall under GATT codes) . 
These two priorities and the major areas where they 
should be pursued vigorously suggest that the Philippines should 
actively work for the strengthening and adherence to GATT rules 
and p r i n c i p l e s . After a l l , GATT itself allows countries to 
formulate their own tariff structures as- long as they are 
transparent and n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y . Indeed, it m i g h t even be 
worthwhile to trade off some of the concessions that developing 
countries get (nonreciprocity and S and D) for stronger rules and 
d i s c i p l i n e . The issue is not so m u c h liberalization, but the 
rationalization of p r o t e c t i o n . 
A third priority covers requests from GATT trading partners 
for either tariff reduction or removal of nontariff b a r r i e r s . 
The array of goods that are of importance to the Philippines is 
discussed s e p a r a t e l y . 
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'Fourth, to the extent p o s s i b l e , the country should seek 
credit for the unilateral trade liberalization measures it has 
undergone. Of course, it. might be .argued that such measures were 
pursued for their own inherent benefit to the country and not for 
negotiation purposes. Nevertheless, the country's trade liberal-
ization program should be used as part of the country's response 
to the New Round. 
Political Coalitions 
The Uruguay Round is seen not only as a forum for advancing 
Philippine priorities that would enhance economic transformation 
but also for a collective realization of the importance of 
strengthening r u l e s : and disciplines that govern world trade. 
Among the mechanisms for, active participation among countries 
which share common concerns are coalitions, political groupings, 
regional blocks and others. 
The Philippines has actively involved itself in the Cairns 
group of countries seeking faiir trade in agriculture. This 
coalition which includes a mixture.of developing and developed 
countries alike advocate the removal of subsidies in agriculture, 
the liberalization of nontariff barriers, and more rigid 
application of GATT codes to agriculture. 
What the Cairns Group espouses coincides with what the 
Philippines is pushing for. This includes trade in agriculture 
with the minimum- of distortion in the form of subsidies and 
access restrictions, and the elimination of these over a speci-
fied timetable; a surveillance mechanism to ensure compliance' and 
remedial action; and international cooperation on minimizing the 
use of health reasons for erecting trade barriers. In addition, 
there is recognition by the Cairns Group that problems related to 
agricultural trade must be reformed over a long-term, so that a 
maximum phased-in period of ten years may be n e c e s s a r y . For this 
reason, the Group calls for early relief through a freeze on 
access barriers, commitment to more responsible stock management 
and cutback on all export and production subsidies. The 
Philippine alliance with this block of countries indicates not 
only adherence to stricter GATT codes, but also a recognition of 
the coalition as a strong voice in the GATT negotiations. 
The country also adopts a united front with the ASEAN-
member countries. On substantive matters, the Philippines allies 
itself with ASEAN in seeking for an objective formula to tariff 
reduction with continuous application of the S and D principle; 
rollback of NTMs; and strengthening of safeguard provisions 
including the bringing of all grey areas into the; GATT umbrella. 
Finally, the Philippines has been allied with the Group of 77 
(G-77). Because of the size and heterogeneity of this Group, its 
stand on trade issues has tended to be e x t r e m e , and the 
Philippines has not fully subscribed to its p o s i t i o n s . 
New Issues in the Uruguay Round 
Three new issues are included in the agenda of the Uruguay 
Round — trade in services, intellectual property rights, and 
trade-related investment measures. In the preparation of the 
agenda, the inclusion of these new issues has been surrounded 
witn controversy. On the one hand, many developing countries 
question their inclusion. On the other hand, the United States, 
along with other developed countries, virtually hinged the 
opening of the new round to their inclusion. 
Trade in Services 
Although very few countries ever really practice free trade/ 
there is general acceptance, at least in p r i n c i p l e , that fewer 
barriers to trade in goods and commodities across countries would 
be beneficial to all. When it comes to trade in services, 
however, nothing near such an agreement exists, arising, perhaps, 
from the different nature of service transactions. Unlike g o o d s , 
services cannot be stored. Trade could, and often does, also 
entail not just a flow of output, but more importantly a movement 
of factors of production themselves. 1/ L a b o r , for example, 
could • be directly exported or imported as an essential part of 
the service transaction. So is capital, physical and financial, 
in many cases (e.g., transportation, shipping, banking). Opening 
up the service sector thus involves more than allowing port 
entry. in the case of the banking sector, for example, 
liberalization would imply some loss of control in money supply. 
In general, opening up the financial sector is seen as making it 
vulnerable to external manipulations. 
Thus, arguments and resistance against trade liberalization 
in the case of services are perhaps even more intense than in the 
case of goods trade. The concerns are similar, e . g . , the effect 
on development, the case of infant industry, and national 
security and sovereignty. There is validity in certain aspects 
of these concerns, but as in the case of the goods trade, the 
theory of comparative advantage holds. Although there is no 
doubt that liberalization would be accompanied by short-run 
adjustment costs, dynamic gains from liberalized trade are also 
undeniable. These gains would arise mainly from a more efficient 
allocation of resources both globally and internally. 
1/ 
Bhagwati (1987) offers a categorization of the type of 
services according to distance between user and supplier — 
a . Physical proximity essential, under which falls the following 
categories: (1) mobile provider, immobile user, (2) mobile u s e r , 
immobile provider, (3) mobile user, mobile producer; and b . 
Physical proximity inessential which he calls "long-distance" 
services. 
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As in goods trade, exceptions could be justified and 
warranted for reasons of national security and sovereignty. This 
could mean, for instance, a special treatment of the banking 
sector. In any case, the service sector could have special 
problems arising from its special nature; but special treatment 
need not be precluded either. 
For the Uruguay Round, the immediate consideration is not 
whether the Philippines should accede to services trade 
liberalization. The indication for long-run direction seems 
clear — the eventual inclusion of services in the global process 
of trade liberalization. The pressing concern is whether the 
Philippines should opt for the so-called single or dual-track 
formula. That is, should GATT be simply augmented to cover 
services as well as goods or should a separate institution or 
agreement be established to regulate world trade in services. 
In general, the priority for the Philippines, as with other 
LDCs, for the Uruguay Round remains to be trade in goods and 
commodities. A legitimate fear is that inclusion of trade in 
services would shift the focus away from this area. Furthermore, 
existing national laws and regulations on services would then 
become open to disputes under GATT. Thus, it is not difficult to 
foresee a situation where quid pro quo arrangements between trade 
in services and trade in goods have become possible, or one 
where an industrialized country would retaliate against some 
restriction on trade in services by closing its market to the 
goods export of the concerned country. 
These possibilities are real, but they do not necessarily 
justify exclusion of services under GATT. In essence, imperfect 
as it may b e , this is part of the GATT process of removing trade 
barriers. A country grants concessions to receive concessions. 
The process may not be perfect, but neither is it a zero-sum 
game. Both negotiating parties benefit from a more liberalized 
trade. The developed countries probably stand to gain most in 
the beginning with services liberalization. But the potential for 
dynamic gains could also be far reaching for the developing 
countries. For the Philippines, a number of possibilities could 
arise. One example is the area of labor exports. This touches 
immigration issues and the United States is now reluctant to 
include it in the negotiations. But this stance would be more 
and more difficult to defend, with liberalization in other areas 
of the service sector. 
Before real negotiations in trade in services could even 
begin, parameters, scope and coverage should first be clearly 
defined and agreed upon. Even this is easier said than done. It 
has taken GATT these many years to reach only so far in the area 
of trade in goods and commodities. The local economy would have 
plenty of time to gear itself towards such new possibilities in 
the global arena. 
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Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights represent another new issue 
whose inclusion in the agenda of the Uruguay Round has created a 
North-South division among the member countries. The debate 
centers around whether GATT, as opposed to the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIP0), is the appropriate venue for 
negotiations. 
To be sure, there are opposing arguments regarding the 
role of intellectual property rights in technological 
development. 2/ Still, on the whole, few, perhaps none, would 
openly renounce respect for property rights. For her part, the 
Philippines is already a signatory to both the Paris Convention 
(industrial property) and the Berne Convention (copyright). As 
such, whether or not IPR would be under GATT supervision would 
not greatly affect the Philippines. 
Trade-related Investment Measures 
Trade-related investment measures refer to trade-distorting 
measures accompanying foreign investment regulations and the 
movement of capital itself. The latter directly relates to the 
limited entry of foreign capital. With regards to the former, 
major examples are local content requirements and export 
performance requirements. 
On purely economic grounds, there are no reasons why the 
entry of foreign investment (and foreign labor, for that matter) 
should be curtailed. At the same time, however, so long as 
some success in trade liberalization is achieved, the removal of 
barriers to foreign investment' is also less urgent. 3/ Political 
2/ 
The economic rationale for patents is well-understood — 
that although inventions become "free goods" once created, to 
produce it could be expensive. Thus, granting the inventor 
temporary monopoly, although sub-optimal in the short-run, would 
bestow the necessary incentives for the production of inventions. 
In effect, short-run costs are being balanced against the larger 
dynamic and long-run benefits that would arise from future 
inventions. But even this is being questioned as being 
applicable only in a closed theoretical model. The distribution 
of benefits would be lopsided in favor of the already wealthy 
industrialized countries. Hence, even on economic grounds, the 
issue whether there should be global protection of intellectual 
property rights or not has not been settled. 
3/ 
There is some degree of substitutability between mobility 
of goods (and services) and mobility of factors across borders 
with respect to the optimal global allocation of resources. 
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and other non-economic factors could become the primary 
considerations, just as they are in the case of labor imports for 
many countries. 
in the case of the Philippines, foreign investments are 
welcome. In general, 40.0 percent foreign equity is allowed. In 
prefered areas, i.e., pioneer and export, foreign equity could be 
as much as 100 percent. Thus, as far as entry is concerned, the 
Philippines is relatively open. It only reserves the right to 
choose what it considers to be desirable areas where foreign 
investments would come in and what it considers to be tied in 
with its developmental objectives. A general liberalization of 
foreign investment as far as entry is concerned is not feasible 
nor called for. This general stance, however, does not preclude 
trading specific concession for investment areas, e.g., negotia-
ting for attractive commodity markets in exchange for an invest-
ment area. 
More in line with GATT supervision are the trade measures 
accompanying investment policies. Most prominently identified 
are export requirement and the local content programs. The 
Philippines uses both policy measures. Firms exporting at least 
70.0 percent of its output are allowed to have 100 percent 
equity. Thus, the export performance requirement is enforced 
only for firms outside pioneer areas with 100 percent equity. 
The export requirement is not trade distorting, just a means to 
attract foreign investment in what it considers to be desired 
areas (export). The local content programs, on the other hand, 
clearly have trade-distorting effects. Even in the Philippines, 
removal of these distortions is being debated upon. 
In general, then, the Philippines could be expected to face 
fewer problems in this area of GATT negotiations. It could 
conceivably be used to strengthen the Philippine position in 
areas where it is weak. Another possibility is for the 
Philippines to maintain a low profile in the negotiation in this 
area and strategically align itself with another country if the 
opportunity arises. 
V . PHILIPPINE TRADE: OPTION AND STRATEGIES 
The Philippines is an open economy and as such has to 
contend with a global system of trade. The task at hand within 
the context of improving this system is to formulate an agenda 
not only indicating trade options but" the implied strategies in 
pursuing them. The objective of these options is to support and 
facilitate the vision of a growing economy with a sound trade 
sector. 
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We begin by outlining an agenda for Philippine positions in 
"the general issues surrounding the multilateral trade negotia-
tions. A set of p r i o r i t i e s , earlier indicated, is considered to 
define the country's trade p a r a m e t e r s . Then an agenda for 
negotiations in tariffs is detailed specifying those which the 
Philippines ought to seek reduction from its trading p a r t n e r s . 
Nontariff barriers as they affect specific trade flows and as 
they are identified for rollback or standstill are then spelled 
o u t . A number of strategies are finally p r o p o s e d . 
General Issues 
Some priorities for the Philippines in the Uruguay Round 
were earlier advanced. A number dealt with issues relating to 
the modification or refinement of contracting rules of GATT .or 
changes in the various existing codes to make the global system 
of multilateral trade more transparent and indeed non-
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y . 
The intent behind the suggestions that the country actively 
participate in improving rules and definition regarding 
s a f e g u a r d s , subsidies, nontariff barrier removals and integra-
tion of bilateral or special trade arrangements into GATT stems 
from a subscription to a more neutral nondistortionary global 
e n v i r o n m e n t . Within this c o n t e x t , countries produce and trade in 
accordance with the existing and potential comparative advantages 
associated with resource e n d o w m e n t s , technology and p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
The formulation" and agreement to nondiscriminatory rules for 
t^ade transcend the sorting out of tariff-reduction requests or 
individual negotiations regarding nontariff b a r r i e r s . For as 
long as the rules are adhered to and they are tightly applied on 
an MFN-basis, trade flows will reflect the frontiers of a 
transformation space, i.e., t'ney will be o p t i m a l . 
While it is true that the Philippines' short-term interest 
may be served by bilateral a g r e e m e n t s , special and differential 
t r e a t m e n t , Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) p r o v i s i o n s , 
e t c . , its long term development requires a more neutral trade 
r e g i m e . Thus, it is important for the country to seek tighter 
rules in an overall global framework that may be followed by all 
contracting parties and to avoid the use of discretion in trading 
p r a c t i c e s . This includes the formula approach to tariff 
r e d u c t i o n , more rules governing nontariff m e a s u r e s , e t c . 
Invoking S and D treatment for the Philippines or a more 
general GSP for our products may yield some benefits for the 
country's trade. But aside from the problem of balancing of 
long-term with short-term interests, there are other important 
f a c t o r s . One is accepting a greater commitment to trade through 
reciprocal concessions consistent with the required structural 
reforms of the c o u n t r y . Indeed, there should be r e c i p r o c i t y , no 
matter how limited, within a broad development f r a m e . Even in 
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"the case of standstill and rollback, S and D should be invoked 
sparingly. Then there is the question of unduly casting the 
economy in a mold partly determined by S and D privilege that is 
temporal in nature. 
The use of GSP provides a convenient adjustment mechanism 
for the Philippines to compete against mature traders on better 
footing. But again, this should be timebound and with specific 
criteria for graduation. It is not so clear whether the young 
dynamic exporting nations did get their stimulus from GSP. And 
for those which really find difficulties breaking out into the 
export markets, GSP is not as important as a package of 
assistance involving technology support, marketing assistance or 
direct subsidies. Amidst all these, the priorities on 
safeguards, strengthening of existing codes, etc., become even 
more important. 
Finally, as far as the general issues of procedure and 
methodology are concerned, it is important to bear in mind that 
they affect not only exports from the Philippines but also 
imports into the country. 
Tariff Barriers 
The last Tokyo Round resulted in a sharp reduction of 
average tariffs for traded industrial products covering 90 
percent of world trade. Moreover, these nondiscriminatory tariff 
reductions were bound. Given this, is there scope for Philippine 
options in this Round along the tariff area? 
There are several areas which suggest some scope for 
Philippine positions. First, while tariff rates have been 
reduced as a result of the Tokyo Round, their levels retain a 
bias against developing countries. For instance, while tariff on 
imports into Japan of manufactures was 10.8 percent before the 
Tokyo Round this fell to 6.4 percent after. On the other hand, 
the tariff on imports into Japan of manufactures from developing 
countries averaged 11.0 percent before the Tokyo Round and fell 
to 6.7 percent after. 
Second, there continues to be a bias against the entry of 
processed products despite the reduction of absolute rates. 
Tariff rates on Philippine exports of raw materials are lower 
than on manufactured products whether principally agriculture or 
manufacture, whether to the US, Japan or the EEC. This is quite 
apparent in the case of coconut product exports to Japan and the 
EEC. Tariff rates on copra are lower than those on crude coconut 
oil. The former usually comes in duty free while the latter has 
different rates. There are also disparities in the tariff rates 
for veneer sheets and plywood. 
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Third, there are differences in the tariff rates under MFN 
and under GSP which tend to accentuate the bias. For example, 
coconut products exported to the EEC will find an implied higher 
effective protection rate (EPR) under GSP than under MFN. The 
same accentuation can be found in the tariff rates applied to 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries by the EEC. 
The Philippine experience with GSP suggests that the country 
has not utilized this mechanism as much as other countries such 
as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore or Hongkong. Globally in 1983, the 
share of the,Philippines to total preferential imports stood at 
2.4 percent (cf. Taiwan's 27.7 percent) although utilization 
rates varied by country (20.0 percent in the US for example). 
Although there remains a scope for greater use of GSP rates for 
Philippine exports, it is equally important to reduce the bias 
against processed exports. 
. Of course, this tariff escalation is also apparent if not 
more pronounced for the Philippines. There is, therefore, some 
scope- for mutual tariff reduction of traded product independent 
of urging for reducing escalation biases against exports of 
Philippine manufactures. Because of the higher absolute tariffs 
in the Philippines, there is a relatively larger potential for 
reduction in the case of Philippine imports than among importing 
countries from the Philippines. This can be readily seen in 
Tables 4 and 5 wherein there are product groups with tariff 
rates remaining above 30.0 percent. These are candidate groups 
for reciprocal reduction of tariffs. 
The residue of the nonreciprocity principle followed in the 
Tokyo Round is also apparent here. In particular, since in the 
last Round most developing countries were not expected to grant 
tariff reductions in exchange for what the developed countries 
had negotiated among themselves and then multilateralized on MFN-
basis, the disparities in the tariff levels emerged. It c a n , 
therefore, be said that if some developing countries including 
the Philippines will have to grant substantial rates of tariff 
reductions, these simply reflect the nonreciprocity actions in 
the previous Round. 
In sum, there seems to be some scope for tariff rate 
reduction that can be agreed upon in the current Round of MTN. 
Non-Tariff Barriers 
As noted in the early sections, in the last few years, trade 
has increasingly been conducted out of the GATT main umbrella. 
Barriers of the nature that are distortionary and nontransparent 
have widely been erected that restrict the free flow of goods. 
Indeed, non-tariff measures (NTMs) appear to be a more pervasive 
factor in global trade than simple tariffs. 
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There are formidable and significant non-tariff m e a s u r e s 
that major Philippine exports face in the developed country 
markets of the US, Japan and the E E C . There are several 
observations that can be made about these. One is that even in 
agricultural exports which enter duty free on an MFN or GSP 
b a s i s , there are an array of NTMs faced. This is^ true for 
robusta coffee (free on MFN to the US and Japan), copra (free on 
MFN to the E E C ) , and centrifugal sugar (free on GSP to the U S ) . 
These products face such NTMs as health and sanitary regulations 
in the U S , commodity and internal taxes and phytosanitary 
regulations in Japan, import r e s t r i c t i o n , l i c e n s i n g , health 
certification and entry control m e a s u r e s in the E E C . 
Another is that where the Philippines can invoke duty-free 
entry on a GSP-basis for m a n u f a c t u r e s , they are usually subject 
to voluntary export restraints and customs formalities and 
d o c u m e n t a t i o n . These products are m o s t l y g a r m e n t s . For other 
p r o d u c t s , there are bilateral quotas or licensing for 
surveillance as in footwear. 
A third observation is that the, absence of NTMs does not 
necessarily induce exports to that NTM-free c o u n t r y . For 
instance, the bulk of electronic micro circuit exports went to 
the EEC which has bilateral quotas and discretionary l i c e n s i n g , 
instead of the US without a known N T M . This is also clearly 
apparent for many garment exports which have gone to. the US and 
the EEC with many NTMs and not to Japan without a known N T M . 
A standstill and rollback of NTMs will bind trade flows on 
the basis of tariff structures. This will reduce much of the 
unpredictability and uncertainty in world trade. M o r e o v e r , reduc-
tion of NTMs will also expand the scope for GATT codes to a p p l y . 
There is a wide scope among NTMs for serious review and 
realignment into regular GATT a g r e e m e n t s . A particular candidate 
here is the M F A . While the Philippines is a signatory to the 
a g r e e m e n t , there is a perception that the country is only a 
marginal p a r t i c i p a n t . Its potential both for quota expansion or 
displacement of higher cost developing countries would be limited 
by the pre-arranged conditions of M F A . 
Link to Overall Trade and Macroeconomic Policies 
In pursuit of the trade a g e n d a , a number of general and 
specific strategies presents t h e m s e l v e s . Before getting to 
these, h o w e v e r , several factors involving the overall trade and 
macroeconomic policy framework need to be taken into a c c o u n t . 
Given the export interests of the Philippines, will the 
current structural reforms alter the nature and characteristic of 
trade? Can we. expect a firmer accentuation of the array of 
tradeable products or will there be new exportable lines? 
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The combination of rural development and appropriate trade 
-liberalization may induce the expansion of labor-using and 
export-oriented light manufacturing industries. The liberaliza-
tion of raw material imports for the textile industry (polyester 
staple fiber, filament yarn, spun yarn) will have two significant 
effects. One would be on direct exports as costs are reduced, 
prices become competitive, and quality improvesi The other would 
be on greater linkages and integration of the garments industry 
as it becomes competitive and garments manufacturers increase 
their domestic purchases of textiles (from the present 20-30 
percent of local markets). The growth rate in real gross value 
added (GVA) of textile manufactures for the first quarter of 1987 
is about the same as wearing apparel, both being higher than the 
average for manufacturing. In the new Round, therefore, there is 
a need to survey both non-tariff and tariff measures for textiles 
not just in the developed country markets but also in other 
countries. 
Another industry which has potential for expansion is canned 
tuna and food exports especially as the supply of tin plate's to 
Philippine manufactures become more liberalized. Despite the 
apparent decline in the Philippine share of prepared or preserved 
tuna (in airtight containers) in US imports, which stood at 25.0 
percent in 1983, this export product is very likely to retain 
its competitiveness. Of course, such liberalization can expand 
to other processed food products. Aside from non-tariff measures 
Such as quotas, health and sanitary regulations and possible 
countervailing duty, the duties imposed on tuna exports range 
from 6.0 percent to 35.0 percent without any GSP indicated. 
There are other industries which may break out into export 
markets on a more sustained basis. These include the metal 
industries (via the exports of GI sheets, pipes, tubes, 
f ittii\gs) , simple machineries, and miscellaneous manufactures 
which include travel goods, toys, etc. Of course, we need not 
mention the expansion of the current range of exports especially 
when structural problems are directly addressed. As quality 
weaknesses are corrected, stability of raw materials supply 
assured and other infrastructure put in place, exports of 
fur niture and fixtures, electrical machinery, publishing and 
printing, among others, can be expected to expand. 
There are also some external dimensions that would be 
relevant to increased access of Philippine exports. One is the 
effect of changes in real effective exchange rates. A real 
depreciation of the peso or a real appreciation of the currencies 
of destination markets would increase the competitiveness of 
Philippine exports. What once were products that could not 
compete will now become cheaper even with the tariff duties 
imposed. Another external factor is income growth which by 
itself would increase demand given relevant elasticities. And 
then there is the "political capital" that countries may have and 
use in order to gain access. But beyond these "shift" variables 
must be country efforts to cross tariff and nontariff boundaries. 
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These macroeconomic dimensions are in fact of critical 
importance to condition the impact of any decline in trade 
barriers. Exchange rate movements have far reaching effects than 
tariff reductions. Basic monetary and fiscal policies also exert 
significant effects. Thus, real exchange depreciations have 
similar consequences as unilateral reduction of tariffs across-
the-board. The degree of fiscal surpluses or deficits in turn 
impact on trade behavior and price movements. 
Strategies 
First, with respect to the general issues of tightening 
GATT rules, definitions, etc., a strategy which can be taken is 
for coalitions with other countries, similar exporters, and 
regional groupings. The Cairns group which the Philippines 
identifies with is an illustration of this strategy. Similarly, 
along with ASEAN countries, the Philippines can . pursue general 
issues on a more concerted basis. 
Because of the concentrated nature of trade directions, 
negotiating efforts can be country specific. For example, 
coconut-related and sugar-related products have their markets in 
the US and the EEC, while shrimps, pineapples and bananas usually 
have Japan as destination. 
Second, on tariff barriers, there is an option of selecting 
products of importance to the Philippines. Here, what may be 
important to the US (in terms of shares.of our exports) may only 
be an insignificant share of the destination market. There may 
not be substantial resistance to giving concessions. On the 
other hand, where tariff reduction is pursued on products which 
occupy a large share of markets, it may be difficult to be 
granted concessions. A balance needs to be struck between 
negotiating for improved access in products or markets where we 
are significant suppliers and where we are yet to attain a 
foothold (which could be products with potential expansion) - for 
example, builders' woodwork, household utensils, vis-a-vis bags 
and baskets in the US; plywood, household utensils vis-a-vis 
veneer corestock in Japan; basketwork, gloves and mittens vis-a-
vis canned preserved tuna and pineapple concentrates in the EEC. 
Third, there is the question of seeking MFN or GSP 
concessions and within GSP itself, even lower tariffs. Indeed, 
in the previous Round, the Philippines worked along the principle 
of seeking concessions on specific products of interest while 
relying on the MFN clause in the concessions granted other 
developing countries to receive indirect benefits. MFN is argued 
to be more permanent while GSP is transitory though the 
Philippines is still far from graduating out of GSP. It is also 
true that for some products, there is a wide margin between MFN 
and GSP rates which could spell competitiveness. Again some 
balance may be necessary in negotiating for MFN or GSP. 
28 
Fourth, the Philippines can pursue her requests for trade 
concessions without any reciprocity or gnid pro q u o . She can 
invoke the unique conditions of the country requiring special 
arrangements. She can capitalize on the global admiration for 
the country's new d e m o c r a c y . U l t i m a t e l y , one has to ask how 
successful this approach is or how widespread nonreciprocity can 
g e t . It is not likely that this will get far enough and there is 
a limit to its effectiveness. In fact, this has rapidly 
diminished in importance. If this process does take p l a c e , the 
country should seek understanding and concession for infant 
industry arguments for some export products and allow a time-
bound system of export incentives without threats of 
countervailing d u t i e s . 
Fifth, we can seek: (a) credit for the unilateral trade 
liberalization pursued by the country; and (b) concessions for 
the tariff reduction program envisioned in the next few y e a r s . 
Because of the transfer of protection from quantitative 
restrictions to tariffs, some rates have been raised as interim 
measures with an eventual reduction towards more uniform effec-
tive protection rates. We can take the stand that in exchange 
for the program we ought to be given access to particular 
markets. The difficulty here is that our liberalization program 
is viewed as a structural change we seek for the country's own 
interests. There may be tough negotiations for tying trade 
liberalization with concessions. Part of the exchange may be the 
binding of t a r i f f s . 
Finally, there is the question of which market to begin 
w i t h . With a combination of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
facing our e x p o r t s , it would not be easy to determine which 
market and in what manner negotiations start. Bilateral exchange 
can take place with the EEC if further trade diversification is 
intended. Negotiations with the US and Japan can presumably be 
on the basis of increasing the breadth of our trade rather than 
our share for specific p r o d u c t s . 
The eventual shape of our trade negotiations needs to 
consider the country's long-run c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , the appropriate-
ness of our export menu as reflecting the country's comparative 
advantage, and our approaches to them whether multilateral or 
b i l a t e r a l . Perhaps the country can urge for across-the-board 
tariff reductions in a multilateral setting but work on specific 
products on an item by item a p p r o a c h . 
In the area of NTMs it is important to realize that a 
strategy of bilateral reduction of non-tariff barriers will have 
to be m u l t i l a t e r a l i z e d . While the Philippines can negotiate for 
opening destination markets for specific exports (e.g., 
Philippine mangoes for Korean apples) in exchange for opening her 
markets, a consequence of GATT rules would be that the 
Philippines cannot discriminate in favor of or against one 
country. 
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The removal of quantitative restrictions is a major strategy 
for trade expansion in an overall context of increasing 
protectionism v This can be done both by standstill or removal of 
restrictions and by bringing into the GATT ambit other forms of 
NTMs such as the MFA. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a renewed vigor of "nationalism" in the Philippines 
today. This is reflected in the range of issues from the US 
bases to the role of multinationals. Naturally, there is doubt 
about the effectiveness and even relevance of a more open 
economy. Moreover, there is an equal doubt about whether the 
country should, participate; in a multilateral trading, system. 
After all, it is argued that the developed countries themselves 
practice discrimination, and protection openly. The newly 
industrializing ..countries themselves had also, deliberately., 
protected their economies (using even more nontransparent non-
tariff measures) before their liberalization. The latter is a 
source1 of. clue as to the trade policy the Philippines "should 
take. All these point to serious questions about considering the 
new Uruguay Round as an appropriate vehicle for the country's 
participation in world trade. Indeed, they even point to a 
question about Philippine membership in GATT. 
The implied options under this scenario include bilateral, 
negotiations between the Philippines and specific trading 
partners to open up particular markets or remove NTMs mutually. 
For example, the Philippines can negotiate with Korea for imports 
of apples (from Korea) in exchange for free entry of Philippine 
coconut products. The Philippines can negotiate with Japan for 
removal of NTMs on Philippine garments in exchange for , lifting 
quantitative restrictions on Japanese car imports. And so on. 
The history of world trade, however, is replete, with 
evidence that bilateralism limits global exchange and growth. It 
has not been accomodative of trade expansion. For one, it is 
inefficient in the sense of resources used to arrange trade 
transactions with every (or most) country traded. For another, 
inefficient as it may seem, it becomes effective only under an 
assumption that other countries follow the same principle. 
The major trading countries of the world, however, realize 
that the principle of nondiscrimination in trade is still 
superior and efficient. There is also acceptance that the GATT 
appears to be the only viable mechanism for promoting and 
disciplining trade. In the face of renewed protectionism, 
increasing bilateral arrangements, and the use of NTMs, there is 
a greater, realization for strengthening GATT rules and expanding 
the scope of its product coverage. 
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The Uruguay Round of MTN is a concrete manifestation of 
commitment to nondiscrimination in trade. The major trading 
countries have signified not only to open negotiations for 
increased exchange but are expressing commitment to expand the 
coverage to include those earlier transacted out of GATT. Is 
there a rationale for the Philippines to actively participate in 
this Round? 
This paper has argued that both the country's short-term and 
long-term interests would be better served through active 
involvement in the formulation and negotiation of rules and codes 
that will become the sustainable framework in the conduct of 
world trade including conciliation and settlement of disputes. 
In the first p l a c e , - t h e economic structure of the 
Philippines shows it is quite dependent on trade. But ; as an 
open economy; its basic structure has been influenced by 
prolonged import substitution policies. • To allow it to become 
adoptive and rely more on its comparative advantages* it has to 
respond to the global system of relative prices and tariff 
structures without being hampered by nontransparent barriers. 
Its internal reforms require and would be ineffective without 
reforms in its external sector. 
Second, despite its provisional membership with GATT during 
the last Tokyo Round, the Philippines benefited from both its 
negotiations for specific tariff requests along with its offe,rs 
and the MFN status that derives from concessions given by other 
countries. The Philippines may not have gotten the tariff cuts 
it had specifically requested, but it seems that the quantitative 
magnitude of the benefits was indeed large and could - not have 
been acquired without the MFN principle adhered to in the Round. 
Third, for as long as GATT codes are tightened ^ and 
definitions for a number of its articles fairly circumscribed, 
the country should be able to participate and adjust according to 
its resource endowments and potentials. That is why among the 
country's top priorities in the Uruguay Round are those that 
should pertain to tighter rules, elimination and roll-back of 
NTMs, removal of subsidies and integration of all products 
(agriculture and the MFA) into GATT. 
Fourth, within GATT itself, the country benefits through 
Special and differential treatment under GSP or broader 
nonreciprocity. it has been pointed out in the paper, however, 
that these concessions may cast the country's economic structure 
not entirely consistent with its long-run trade regime. But even 
coalitions and concerns over GSP are considered within the 
context of GATT. While it may be that nonreciprocity or GSP are 
not in the higher priorities for the Philippines, GATT is still 
the venue for their negotiations and agreements. 
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And finally, there is considerable importance to the country 
of the new issues proposed for inclusion in the new Round. More 
people pointed out that some aspects of these issues (e.g., 
services) are integral to our trade functions. It is also 
equally important to remember that the country does have some 
leverage in terms of negotiating strategies as in aspects of 
labor services. 
Given the conviction that tne Philippines should participate 
individually "and collectively with ASEAN or broader coalitions, 
this paper explored a range of issues surrounding the Uruguay 
Round that may be useful in considering, trade policy options for 
the Philippines.. It also suggested specific strategies to 
pursue in the new Round. 
To the extent that the Philippines subscribes to a need for 
a framework for conducting world trade in a nondiscriminatory 
manner, the new Round is critically important. In turn, the 
outcome of the country's participation in the new Round would 
only be as good as the efforts made in preparation for it — be 
that ,with coalitions cutting across groups of countries or 
regional groupings or as an individual country. 
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